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Are boards on board? A model of corporate board influence on sustainability 
ABSTRACT: A model is developed that takes into account: (1) human capital of outside directors; (2) 
social capital of outside directors; and (3) human and social capital of CEOs. Beyond this, values are 
largely neglected in the examination of boards of directors, and are also necessary in the study of 
sustainability given its normative implications. The model thus accounts for the value attunement concept 
as a moderating variable. The model proposed in this paper offers original insight into the drivers of 
sustainability performance in organisations and hence, advances corporate governance theory. 
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As the highest level decision-makers (Fama & Jensen 1983), do boards of directors have an influence on 
firms’ sustainability performance? Given that the evidence is thus far inconclusive, additional research is 
needed as sustainability is gaining corporate attention and requires a response (Haanaes et al. 2011). For 
example, Lubin and Esty (2010) suggest that sustainability is fast becoming a business ‘megatrend’, an 
imperative that firms must address in an increasingly open, transparent, and socially aware world. 
Similarly, Bansal (2002) argues that there is now general acceptance that for a planet that is sustainable in 
the future, corporations must engage in sustainability as a matter of strategy and policy because they 
represent the productive resources of the economy. The evidence does suggest that firms are increasingly 
paying attention to sustainability (Haanaes et al. 2011). This paper therefore seeks to develop a model of how 
boards shape whether a firm accepts or disavows sustainability, particularly by examining the role of 
boards and the extent that individual directors enact their values.   
According to the literature, boards have two principle roles. First, drawing on agency theory 
(Fama & Jensen 1983; Jensen & Meckling 1976), boards act as agents of owners to monitor management. 
The monitoring function oversees the alignment of shareholder and management interests, ensuring that 
these do not diverge substantially (Dalton Hitt, Certo & Dalton 2007). Because of the emphasis on 
monitoring and control, agency theory prescribes that boards should consist mainly of independent, 
outside directors (Fama & Jensen 1983). Second, other theories suggest that the main role of the board is 
one of resource provision (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). Given their ties to external constituents, outside 
directors provide key resources, such as information, strategic advice, counsel, and other important 
resources that can impact on firm strategies and legitimacy (Kor & Sundaramurthy 2009). Integrating 
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agency and resource dependency theories, the board capital perspective (Hillman & Dalziel 2003) 
demonstrates that boards’ human and social capital influence both monitoring and resource provision 
roles. However, the model presented in this paper demonstrates that while outside director capital is 
necessary, other conditions are required to ensure that sustainability performance is adequately monitored 
and that sustainability concerns are integrated into decision making at the board level (Figure 1). Two 
other factors have impact.    
 The second factor relates to CEOs. CEOs have significant influence on board decisions; however, 
their powerful influence can subvert decisions necessary to move firms forward beyond the status quo. 
For CEOs to be willing to accept monitoring on sustainability performance and advice and counsel on new 
strategies such as those embracing sustainability, CEO-specific forms of human and social capital are 
necessary. Lastly, sustainability is inherently normative. That is, addressing sustainability is normative 
because it requires firms to confront what they should or should not do on behalf of the social good. 
Hence, an examination of values should be considered in any discussion of boards of directors and 
decision-making on matters related to sustainability.     
SUSTAINABILITY CONCEPTS 
Dominant theories of the firm conceptualize firms as profit-seeking entities, with the sole purpose of 
maximizing shareholder wealth (Kantarelis 2010). These are exemplified by Henderson (2005), who 
argues firms are the basic unit of value creation in society, charged only with producing economic growth 
and wealth. Amongst scholars, little disagreement is likely to arise about this basic function of firms; on 
the other hand, there is serious debate about an extended set of goals beyond profit maximization. A full 
review of these debates is beyond the scope of this paper. However, sustainability is an emerging 
paradigm facing the business community, if not an ‘imperative’ (Lubin & Esty 2010, p. 50), and response 
to this issue is a matter for the highest level of decision-makers to consider, namely, the board of directors 
(Elkington 2006).  
As a concept, sustainability continues to evolve; however, sustainability is generally understood 
as ‘meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
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own needs’ (WCED 1987, p. 43). From this definitional base, there seems to be some implicit consensus 
among scholars that sustainability consists of three principles—economic viability, environmental quality, 
and social responsiveness (Rake & Grayson 2009). These three principles are interrelated and 
interdependent. That is, at the core of sustainability, firms should demonstrate economic, environmental, 
and social performance alike in order to achieve long-term prosperity of the firm and to contribute to the 
long-term prosperity of society and humankind (Bansal 2005). To determine if firms are demonstrating 
sustainability and the extent to which corporate actions might benefit future generations, performance 
should be measured (Atkinson 2000; Epstein & Roy 2001).  
Given that the market mechanism as a whole and individual firms in particular are able to prevail 
in the long-term only if there are healthy finances, measurement of economic viability therefore includes 
indicators such as growth in profits and earnings per share, forward-looking market measures of long-term 
prospects (e.g. market-to-book ratio), and other measures such as cash-flow, which is necessary to sustain 
a firm. Measurement of environmental quality includes aspects such as quantifiable reductions in carbon 
emissions (both in the focal firm and its supply chain partners) and other potentially hazardous byproducts 
and waste, reduced material use, demonstrated improvements in energy efficiency, water conservation, 
and overall minimization of the use of natural capital. Lastly, measurement of social responsiveness 
includes demonstrated employee training initiatives, upholding fair trade and human rights, improvements 
in product safety, increased gender balance in executive appointments, reduced health and safety 
violations, demonstrated equity in wage policies, and investments in communities and regions. In sum, 
measures such as these gauge the extent to which firms are demonstrating sustainability, and the extent to 
which future development and long-term value creation might be assured. However, as noted, sustainable 
firms do not focus exclusively on only one aspect; rather, they strive to demonstrate performance across 
economic, environmental, and social aspects (Bansal 2005).   
BOARDS AND SUSTAINABILITY PERFORMANCE:  A MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Boards of directors are at the strategic apex of decision making (Fama & Jensen 1983). This upper 
echelon position, in theory, gives boards substantial power over how a firm navigates the strategic 
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landscape for the good of shareholders, but also increasingly for the natural environment and society 
(Elkington 2006). To explore board level influence on sustainability performance, the human capital of 
outside directors is explored first. 
Human capital of outside directors and the monitoring role 
There is increased stakeholder scrutiny and institutional pressure on firms to be more accountable for 
environmental and social impacts (Meyer & Kirby 2010). This level of influence may or may not be 
recognized by the board or may not be seen as being as important as economic concerns. The reason for 
this is that generally speaking, inside and outside directors have different interests, goals, and time 
horizons. Inside directors, because of their close ties to agents or their own insider interests, are more 
likely to be attentive to short-term economic goals. Further, insiders are less likely to advocate 
investments in environmental or social strategies, particularly if they conflict with economic goals or 
reduce short-term economic performance. However, sustainability requires a long-term horizon and may 
involve short-term costs to achieve long-term goals (Hahn, Figge, Pinske & Preuss 2010). There is 
evidence to suggest that outside directors may be more attuned to long-term horizons as well as being 
more accepting of short-term losses for the benefit of long-term interests (Johnson & Greening 1999).  
Some research exploring the relationship between boards of directors and matters related to 
sustainability suggests that boards with a higher percentage of outside directors are positively related to 
various measures of environmental and social performance (Ibrahim & Angelidis 1995; Johnson & 
Greening 1999; Webb 2004). However, research into the influence of board composition on sustainability 
performance has thus far been inconclusive. For example, contrary to the findings of Ibrahim and 
Angelidis (1995) and Webb (2004), other research suggests that inside directors are positively associated 
with particular aspects of sustainability performance (Coffey & Wang 1998; Wang & Coffey 1992). More 
recently, Bear, Rahman and Post (2010) examine the relationship between diversity in human capital of 
inside and outside directors and firms’ social performance, finding an insignificant effect. A possible 
explanation for such contradictory or inconclusive findings is previous studies’ lack of focus on specific or 
exclusive types of outside directors. More specifically, it is posited that the extent to which boards monitor 
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managements’ performance on sustainability is influenced by the human capital offered by two specific 
outside director types: support specialists and community influentials (Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold 
2000). 
Support specialists lack general management expertise but offer specialized experience in given 
areas.  Such expertise can include law, the capital markets, public relations, marketing, etc. (Hillman et al. 
2000). According to Hillman et al. (2000), support specialists are vital to boards because they offer 
information about environmental contingencies and provide critical input difficult to obtain elsewhere. 
Support specialists also offer unique perspectives that are difficult to obtain from inside directors, such as 
in industries whose competitive environments are tightly controlled (Hillman et al. 2000). On the other 
hand, community influentials, like support specialists, are also important because they provide necessary 
non-business perspectives on proposed actions and strategies as well as have influence with powerful 
groups in society (Baron 1995; Hillman, Cannella & Harris 2002). Community influentials are more likely 
to discount a ‘pure’ business or competitive orientation, while offering advice and insight on non-business 
orientated stakeholders. Community influentials generally consist of outside board members with 
backgrounds and experience in politics, community groups, NGOs, universities, and other social 
organizations and enterprises.   
In sum, inside directors are expected to be motivated to ensure the firms they oversee are meeting 
economic goals.  However, when complemented with outside directors who are support specialists and 
community influentials, a firm’s environmental and social performance is expected to be monitored and 
improved. Further, when firms neglect their environmental or social performance, consequences can be 
severe, particularly with respect to negative media attention and a loss of legitimacy in society (Bansal 
2005; Haanaes et al. 2011; Scherer & Palazzo 2010). The literature acknowledges that there are 
reputational consequences of bad performance—economic or otherwise—not only for firms, but for 
individual directors as well (Cowen & Marcel 2011; Fama 1980; Fama & Jensen 1983). Outsiders who are 
support specialists and community influentials have an incentive to monitor, intervene, and correct poor 
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performance on environmental and social dimensions not only because of a reputational motivation, but 
because their experiences are best placed to effectively monitor management in these areas. Therefore:   
Proposition 1: Boards with a high proportion of outside directors who are support specialists and 
community influentials are more likely to monitor the extent to which management is 
demonstrating sustainability performance. This monitoring role has a positive influence on the 
future sustainability performance of the firm. 
 
Social capital of outside directors and the resource provision role  
In addition to their human capital, the social capital of outside directors is an important source of ‘access 
to timely information, diverse ideas, and critical…resources’ (Oh, Labianca & Chung 2006, p. 578).  
Simply put, social capital arises through director interlocks, or when an outside director affiliated with one 
organization sits on the board of directors of another organization (Hillman & Dalziel 2003). Generally, 
outside directors serve on the boards of other firms. These board interlocks are important to build the 
social capital needed to fulfill the resource provision function (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Hillman & 
Dalziel 2003).  
 In the case of sustainability, insiders would be expected to have substantial knowledge of the firm 
and the environmental factors facing its industry. Insiders are thus a key source of knowledge of 
opportunities, threats, competitive conditions, technology, and regulation within a specific industry (Kor 
2003). While important, this context-specific knowledge can limit creativity in problem solving due to 
lack of exposure to new or novel ideas outside of the industry (Dutton & Duncan 1987; Ocasio 1997). 
Given the complexity—if not novelty—of sustainability, I argue that the type of interlocks of outside 
directors is vital to develop the social capital that impacts on sustainability performance.  
Sustainability is complex because it demands the integration of economic, environmental, and 
social factors in policy-making (Dovers 1995; Hahn et al. 2010). Yet this level of integration does not 
come easily. First, sustainability is an emerging business issue in which many unknown parameters exist, 
and the ability to align an organization to solve its complex challenges is untested for many firms (Berns 
et al. 2009; Hopkins 2009; Lueneburger & Goleman 2010). Second, insight on how to address 
sustainability may be limited in some industries as there remains much unquantified risk (Hahn & Figge 
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2011; Lueneburger & Goleman 2010). Third, sustainability may require tough decisions on trade-offs, 
such as a decision on making a contribution to sustainability at the societal level that may require a minor 
loss at the corporate level (Hahn et al. 2010). However, there is evidence to suggest that under 
circumstances of complexity, having heterogeneous interlocks (ties to firms in different industries) may be 
better than having homogeneous interlocks (ties to firms in the same industry) (Rodan & Galunic 2004).  
  In complex environments, firms often depend on identifying new strategic alternatives that can be 
influenced by examples outside of the focal industry (Tushman & Anderson 1986). In the case of 
sustainability, because of its inherent complexity, recognition of and response to the matter can be quite 
different across industries (Galbreath 2009). Thus, one way that boards can incorporate a more diverse 
range of resources to address sustainability is through the social capital of outside directors. More 
specifically, outside directors with ties to boards in industries that differ from that of the focal firm 
effectively broaden the schemata or knowledge structures that can be brought to bear on their resource 
provision role. In effect, outside directors with ties to firms in different industries than the focal firm are: 
(1) likely to channel back to the board a greater range of sustainability-related resources and (2) use these 
resources to help the firm avoid or counteract excessive managerial commitment to non-sustainability-
related strategies. Hence:  
Proposition 2: Boards who have outside director interlocks to firms in industries different from 
the focal firm creates diversity in social capital. This diversity of social capital generates valuable 
and timely resources that have a positive influence on the future sustainability performance of the 
firm. 
 
CEO influence on sustainability performance 
Taking outside directors’ human and social capital as important, any discussion of boards, monitoring and 
resource provision functions, and firm outcomes must take into account the CEO (Haynes & Hillman 
2010; Hillman & Dalziel 2003). The main reason being is that under agency theory, boards monitor 
management and the CEO represents the pinnacle of management. However, at the board level, because of 
their position of power, CEOs may be less than accepting of outside directors’ monitoring of current 
management performance or accepting of alternative strategic considerations, advice, or feedback they 
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provide, especially if altering or challenging current pathways or the status quo (Hambrick, Geletkanycz 
& Fredrickson 1993).  
However, recent research suggests that CEOs can demonstrate understanding and adapt to others’ 
advice, perspectives, and criticism even if they diverge from their existing mindsets and perceptions 
(Nadkarni & Herrmann 2010). This openness permits CEOs to effectively consider a wide range of 
strategic alternatives, including those that might deviate from current strategies. Thus, CEOs on the board 
who are more open can consider a broader spectrum of issues in decision making for the firm. I argue that 
there are two ways CEOs are more likely to be open or receptive to discussions of sustainability in the 
boardroom: first, their human capital and second, the influence of their social capital. 
CEO human capital. Upper echelons theory posits that characteristics of top managers explain, in 
part, firm strategy and organizational outcomes (Hambrick & Mason 1984). One primary influencer is the 
functional backgrounds of top mangers (Hambrick & Mason 1984). Functional specialization of top 
managers can bias the definition and influences the course of action adopted in an organizational setting. 
Although Hambrick and Mason (1984) acknowledge that functional backgrounds may not totally 
dominate strategic choices, they nonetheless can be expected to exert significant influence.  
In the case of CEOs, although they can be presumed to have a generalist’s view, they often bring 
an orientation developed in their primary functional area (Hambrick & Mason 1984). Specifically, CEO 
functional experience is an important indicator of the cognitive biases and types of knowledge that they 
bring to the board, and provides a lens through which business problems and solutions are often identified 
and defined (Herrmann & Datta 2002). CEOs with ‘peripheral’ backgrounds (accounting, finance, law) 
(Westphal & Milton 2000) are likely to be biased towards control and efficiency. This could be 
problematic with respect to sustainability as there is much unquantified risk and uncertainty surrounding 
the paradigm (Dovers 1995; Lueneburger & Goleman 2010). On the other hand, CEOs with ‘output’ 
backgrounds (marketing and sales, R&D, engineering) (Tuggle, Schnatterly & Johnson 2010) are more 
attuned to the dynamics of the market and stakeholder requirements, such as those impacting sustainability 
(Galbreath 2010). CEOs with output backgrounds are also better than other background types in dealing 
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with situations involving greater ambiguity and more uncontrollable factors (Gupta & Govindarajan 
1984), which is the case of sustainability. As Bansal (2005, p. 202) notes, sustainability ‘is marked by 
considerable uncertainty because of changing expectations, the complexity of the problem, and the 
difficulty of its resolution’. Hence:       
Proposition 3: A board with a CEO who has significant ‘output’ background experience is more 
likely to accept: (1) monitoring of outside directors on the effectiveness with which current 
management addresses sustainability and (2) resources from outside directors that might be 
relevant to addressing sustainability. This ‘output’ background experience of a CEO has a 
positive influence on the future sustainability performance of the firm. 
 
CEO social capital. CEOs on boards are a key provider of company (‘inside’) information and 
information on the competitive context to the board. An understanding of the competitive context can 
come through board ties with other firms. Generally, CEOs set on the board of at least one other company 
(McDonald & Westphal 2010); such external ties influence the development of their social capital. For 
example, CEOs who serve as outside directors can learn about the efficacy of new approaches to business, 
strategies, and implementation issues by observing first-hand the consequences of management decisions 
at other firms. Moreover, learning derived from CEO interlocks is particularly valuable in that it reflects 
the recent experience of his contemporaries, who face similar macro-economic threats and opportunities 
and socio-political issues. However, unlike the social capital of outside directors (heterogeneous 
interlocks), I posit that CEO social capital that is influenced by firms in the same industry is most 
important (homogeneous interlocks). 
A CEOs framing of an issue such as sustainability will be shaped by the extent to which he 
observes firms in the same industry who are themselves demonstrating success with sustainability 
initiatives. Following Burt (1987), a CEO who considers adopting a practice such as sustainability is most 
likely influenced by adopters to whom he is structurally equivalent; that is, to whom he shares a similar 
social role or social position within the network. Given that CEOs often belong to industry associations 
and other forums of industry interest (Haunschild & Beckman 1998), they develop strong social standing 
with their industry peers. This structural equivalency helps facilitate the exchange of firm-centric 
information and resources that can help in problem solving and decision making within the industry. 
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Moreover, because of structural equivalency, CEOs with interlocks to firms in the same industry who 
demonstrate success with sustainability are likely to increase the acceptance that sustainability is a valid 
approach, as familiarity with others in similar circumstances increases the willingness to accept new 
strategic approaches or adopt new innovations (DiMaggio & Powell 1983).   
Because firms are risk adverse (Laverty 1996), CEOs have motivation to protect current strategies 
and to carefully scrutinize any new direction that diverges from established trajectories. However, when 
CEOs directly observe sustainability success stories in their own industry through intra-industry 
interlocks, they gain a sense of legitimacy of the practices worthwhile to emulate in their own firms. 
Further, having a good mix of director interlocks to similar firms (e.g. CEO interlocks to firms in the same 
industry) and dissimilar firms (e.g. outsider director interlocks to firms in different industries than the 
focal firm) may create an optimal portfolio of social capital. Therefore: 
Proposition 4: A CEO on the board who has interlocks to firms in the same industry that have 
demonstrated successful sustainability strategies increases the social capital needed to address 
sustainability in the focal firm. The flow-on resources from this focused level of social capital has 
a positive influence on the future sustainability performance of the firm. 
 
The moderating influence of value attunement 
Business takes place within a cooperative social context (Ghoshal 2005) and in recent times, complex 
social matters have arisen (Galbreath 2009 2011a). In fact, an underlying driver of the need for firm 
response to sustainability is societal norms, values, and expectations, which are reflected in a growing 
number of social issues that directly relate to sustainability (Galbreath, 2009 2011a). Within the business 
and society literature, scholars have addressed the social issues concept (Lamertz, Martens & Heugens 
2003). Social issues are those that are problematic to society and have an ability to influence government 
or corporate policy (Mahon & Waddock 1992). Galbreath (2011a) notes the variety of social issues 
underlying the need for business to respond to sustainability; however, as Swanson (1999) demonstrates, 
how decision-makers view social issues—and the underlying societal norms, values, and expectations that 
are focusing attention on them—can vary. For purposes here, I focus on normative and descriptive 
perspectives. 
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 Responses to social issues are framed by what firms should or should not do on behalf of the 
social good or by what they do or can do (Wood 1991). What firms should or should not do follows a 
normative approach, and is centred on moral evaluation, judgement, and prescription of human action 
(Treviño & Weaver 1994). What firms do or can do follows a descriptive approach, and is centred on 
explanation, measurement, and prediction (Treviño & Weaver 1994). Hence, normative approaches are 
grounded in values; descriptive approaches are grounded in fact and empiricism. Both have implications 
for individual decision makers. 
Decision makers who face sustainability, societal values, and relevant social issues in a 
descriptive manner can suffer from myopia. Such normative myopia arises because values are either 
removed from decision-making or are not effectively examined or adequately enacted (Swanson 1999). 
Descriptive approaches to decision-making therefore generally focus on profit maximization, because this 
is presumed to be what a corporation does, and responding to social issues is generally ignored, is made 
subservient to financial considerations, or is seen as outside the scope of a firm’s objective (Freeman & 
Gilbert 1992). Directors who ignore the role of values, or who make a strict separation of values and facts 
in decision-making, can therefore put the firms they govern at risk of neglecting stakeholders, and the 
power and influence they can wield over corporate resources. Swanson (1999) refers to this phenomenon 
as value neglect.    
Conversely, directors who display an awareness of their personally held values, while at the same 
time giving due consideration to values held by others, position themselves to be receptive to the social 
issues surfaced through various stakeholder demands and interests, a concept Swanson (1999) refers to as 
value attunement. In this case, not only are director’s personal values enacted, but there exists an 
awareness of and responsiveness to the values of corporate stakeholders and the values of other societal 
constituents. Hence, the work of Swanson (1999) suggests that values can affect the magnitude and 
direction of the relationship between board capital and task performance. Given the monitoring and 
resource provision roles of boards, the expectation is that in boards where all directors do not adequately 
align personal and societal values may have less influence on sustainability performance than what might 
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otherwise be expected, given the previous discussions on outside director and CEO human and social 
capital. 
I therefore posit that value attunement facilitates board decision-making that responds positively 
to the social issues that drive the need for action on sustainability. Where a board’s directors demonstrate 
value attunement, the expectation is that they will integrate an exclusive fiduciary relationship with 
shareholders with a moral relationship with other stakeholders, committing to the welfare, growth, and 
wholeness of all stakeholders while honouring the citizenship duties of the corporation to society. This 
further strengthens the degree to which monitoring and resource provision roles are directed towards 
meeting sustainability demands. Thus:  
Proposition 5: The greater the value attunement amongst all directors the stronger the 
relationship between board capital and monitoring and resource provision roles relative to 
sustainability. Value attunement therefore increases the impact of monitoring and resource 
provision on the future sustainability performance of the firm. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
I have argued that to ensure monitoring and oversight of sustainability is fulfilled at the board level, specific 
forms of board capital are necessary. The human capital of two specific types of outside directors (support 
specialists and community influentials) stimulates the knowledge and experience that is necessary to monitor 
management’s performance on sustainability. Breadth in social capital of outside directors, which results 
from their ties to firms in different industries than the focal firm, brings back to the board necessary 
resources to advise and offer council on effective sustainability strategies. However, powerful CEOs can 
undermine the value of the board capital of outside directors. The model demonstrates that the type of 
human and social capital of CEOs is therefore an important determinant in the extent to which they will be 
receptive and open to monitoring and counsel on sustainability matters, especially from outside directors.   
 Contrary to much research on corporate governance, the model also recognizes the importance of values 
as a moderating factor in the extent to which boards impact sustainability. Sustainability by nature challenges 
firms to consider what they should do with respect to addressing a corporate imperative beyond just an economic 
mandate (Elkington 2006). Because the natural environment and broader societal concerns are considered, 
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sustainability requires a normative approach to business and to decision-making. The model demonstrates that 
Swanson’s (1999) concept of value attunement should be accounted for. Hence, following the call to explore 
contingency models in corporate governance research (Pettigrew 1992), the model takes into account 
intervening variables that are likely to moderate the extent to which boards of directors impact on firm 
performance, economic or otherwise. 
 As for empirical testing, existing studies demonstrate that board capital is readily available, namely 
through sources such as director profiles in governance sections of annual reports (e.g. Haynes & Hillman 
2010). Researchers could collect data on human and social capital as specified in the propositions put forth in 
this paper. Although sustainability is yet to have a universal definition or operationalization, studies suggest that 
proxies can be captured both through the use of surveys and secondary data, such as annual reports, 
supplemental reports (e.g. sustainability reports), or through third party evaluators such as Sustainalytics (e.g. 
Bansal 2005; Galbreath, 2011b). Lastly, the concept of value attunement has yet to be operationalized. 
However, a thorough examination of Swanson’s (1999) concept suggests that one way researchers could 
measure value attunement is through developing Likert scales to be used in a survey of corporate 
directors. Of key interest is studying the longitudinal effects of all constructs, which would require at least 
three to five years of performance data.   
In conclusion, the goal of this paper has been to develop an improved framework for researching 
the role that boards play in improving firms’ strategic responses to the growing sustainability concerns of 
stakeholders, the environment, and society.  While there are many avenues through which firms may 
pursue improved sustainability performance, the paper suggests that boards’ human and social capital and 
value attunement should be recognized as important and essential elements in any effective program for 
improving a firm’s ability to sense and respond to sustainability concerns.  I hope that this discussion 
points the way to new and better approaches to improving the sustainability performance of firms—on 
which the long-term viability of our economies, societies, and the natural environment depends. 
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